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CAUSAL IMPACT OF MASKS, POLICIES, BEHAVIOR ON EARLY
COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN THE U.S.
VICTOR CHERNOZHUKOV, HIROYUKI KASAHARA, AND PAUL SCHRIMPF
Abstract. This paper evaluates the dynamic impact of various policies, such as school,
business, and restaurant closures, adopted by the US states on the growth rates of con-
firmed Covid-19 cases and social distancing behavior measured by Google Mobility Re-
ports, where we take into consideration of people’s voluntarily behavioral response to new
information of transmission risks. Using the US state-level data, our analysis finds that
both policies and information on transmission risks are important determinants of people’s
social distancing behavior, and shows that a change in policies explains a large fraction of
observed changes in social distancing behavior. Our counterfactual experiments indicate
that removing all policies would have lead to 30 to 200 times more additional cases by late
May. Removing only the non-essential businesses closures (while maintaining restrictions
on movie theaters and restaurants) would have increased the weekly growth rate of cases
between -0.02 and 0.06 and would have lead to -10% to 40% more cases by late May.
Finally, nationally mandating face masks for employees on April 1st would have reduced
the case growth rate by 0.1-0.25. This leads to 30% to 57% fewer reported cases by late
May, which translates into, roughly, 30-57 thousand saved lives.
1. Introduction
Accumulating evidence suggests that various policies in the US have reduced social inter-
actions, and have slowed down the growth of Covid-19 infections.1 An important outstand-
ing issue is, however, how much of the observed slow down in the spread is attributable to
the effect of policies per se relative to a voluntarily change in people’s behavior out of fear
of being infected. This question is critical to evaluate the effectiveness of restrictive policies
in the US relative to an alternative policy of just providing recommendations and informa-
tion such as the one adopted by Sweden. More generally, understanding people’s dynamic
behavioral response to policies and information is indispensable for properly evaluating the
effect of policies on the spread of Covid-19.
This paper quantitatively assesses the impact of various policies adopted by the US
states on the spread of Covid-19, such as non-essential businesses closure and mandatory
face masks, paying a particular attention to how people adjust their behavior in response
to policies as well as new information on cases.
Date: May 29, 2020.
Key words and phrases. Covid-19, causal impact, masks, non-essential business, policies, behavior.
1 See Courtemanche et al. (2020), Hsiang et al. (2020), Pei, Kandula, and Shaman (2020), and Abouk
and Heydari (2020).
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We present a conceptual framework that spells out the causal structure on how the
Covid-19 spread is dynamically determined by policies and human behavior. Our approach
explicitly recognizes that policies not only directly affect the spread of Covid-19 (e.g., mask
requirement) but also indirectly affect its spread by changing people’s behavior (e.g., stay
at home order). It also recognizes that people react to new information on Covid-19 cases
and voluntarily adjust their behavior (e.g., voluntary social distancing and hand washing)
even without any policy in place. Our casual model provides a framework to quantita-
tively decompose the growth of Covid-19 cases into three components: (1) direct policy
effect, (2) policy effect through behavior, and (3) direct behavior effect in response to new
information.2
Guided by the causal model, our empirical analysis examines how the weekly growth rates
of confirmed Covid-19 cases are determined by policies and behavior using the US state-
level data. To examine how policies and information affect people’s behavior, we also regress
social distancing measures on policy and information variables. Our regression specification
for case growth is explicitly driven from a SIR model and the estimated regression coefficients
can be interpreted from the viewpoint of the effective reproduction number although our
causal approach does not hinge on validity of a SIR model.
As policy variables, we consider state of emergency, mandatory face masks for employees
in public business, stay at home order, closure of K12, closure of restaurants except take out,
closure of movie theaters, and closure of non-essential business. Our behavior variables are
four mobility measures that capture the intensity of visits to “transit,” “grocery,” “retail,”
and “workplaces” from Google Mobility Reports. We take time trend, the lagged growth
rate of cases, and the log of lagged cases as our measures of information on infection risks
that affects people’s behavior. We also consider the growth rate of tests, the log number
of tests, and the state-level characteristics (e.g., population size and total area) as the
confounders that has to be controlled for in order to identify the causal relationship between
policy/behavior and the growth rate of cases.
Our key findings from regression analysis are as follows. We find that both policies and
information on past cases are important determinants of people’s social distancing behavior,
where policy effects explain at around 80% or more of observed decline in four behavior
variables. We also find that people dynamically adjust their behavior in response to policies
and information with time lag.
There are both large policy effects and large behavior effects on case growth. The esti-
mates from our lag cases information model imply that all policies combined would reduce
the weekly growth rate of cases by around 1. Taking into account of a change in the
number of tests, the weekly growth rates of infections arguably declined from around 2 in
2The causal model is framed using the language of structural equations models and causal diagrams of
econometrics (Wright (1928); Haavelmo (1944); Heckman and Vytlacil (2007); see Greenland, Pearl, and
Robins (1999) for developments in computer science), with natural unfolding potential outcomes represen-
tation (Rubin (1974); Tinbergen (1930); Neyman (1925); Imbens and Rubin (2015)). As such it naturally
converses in all languages for causal inference.
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early March to near 0 in April. Our result suggests that total policy effects explain around
one-half of this decline.
Using the estimated model, we evaluate the dynamic impact of the following counterfac-
tual policies on Covid-19 cases: removing all policies, allowing non-essential businesses to
open, and mandating face masks. The results of counterfactual experiments show a large
impact of some of those policies on the number of cases. They also highlight the importance
of voluntary behavioral response to infection risks for evaluating the dynamic policy effects.
Figure 1 shows how removing all policies would have changed the average growth rate of
cases as well as the number of cases across states. The effect of removing policies on case
growth peaks at 0.6 after two to three weeks, and then gradually declines. This decline
happens because people voluntarily adjust their behavior in response to information on a
higher number of cases. The estimate implies that there would have been 30-200 times
more cases (10 to 100 million additional cases) by late May if all policies had never been
implemented.
Figure 2 illustrates how allowing non-essential businesses open would have affected the
case growth and cases. Keeping non-essential businesses open (other than movie theaters,
gyms, and keeping restaurants in the “take-out” mode) would have increased the cases
by −10% to 40%. These estimates contribute to the ongoing efforts of evaluating various
reopening approaches (Stock, 2020a).
Figure 3 show that implementing mandatory face masks on April 1st would have reduced
the case growth rate by 0.1-0.25, leading to reductions of −30% to −57% in reported
cases in late May. This roughly implies that 30-57 thousand lives would have been saved.3
This finding is significant: given this potentially large benefit for reducing the spread of
Covid-19, mask mandates is an attractive policy instrument especially because it involves
relatively little economic disruption. Again, these estimates contribute to the ongoing efforts
of designing approaches to minimize risks from reopening.
A growing number of other papers have examined the link between non pharmaceutical
interventions and Covid-19 cases.4 Hsiang et al. (2020) estimate the effect of policies on
Covid-19 case growth rate using data from the United States, China, Iran, Italy, France,
and South Korea. In the United States, they find that the combined effect on the growth
rate of all policies they consider is −0.347 (0.061). Courtemanche et al. (2020) use US
county level data to analyze the effect of interventions on case growth rates. They find that
the combination of policies they study reduced growth rates by 9.1 percentage points 16-20
days after implementation, out of which 5.9 percentage points is attributed to shelter in
place orders. Both Hsiang et al. (2020) and Courtemanche et al. (2020) adopted “reduced-
form” approach to estimate the total policy effect on case growth without using any social
3As of May 27, 2020, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports 99,031 deaths in the
US.
4We refer the reader to Avery et al. (2020) for a comprehensive review of a larger body of work researching
Covid-19; here we focus on few quintessential comparisons on our work with other works that we are aware
of.
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Figure 1. Average change in case growth and relative change in cases of
removing all policies
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Figure 2. Average change in case growth and and relative change in cases
from leaving non-essential businesses open
distancing behavior measures. In contrast, our study highlights the role of behavioral
response to policies and information.
Existing evidence for the impact of social distancing policies on behavior in the US is
mixed. Abouk and Heydari (2020) employ a difference-in-differences methodology to find
that statewide stay-at-home orders has strong causal impact on reducing social interactions.
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Figure 3. Average change in case growth and and relative change in cases
from mandating masks for employees on April 1st
In contrast, using the data from Google Mobility Reports, Maloney and Taskin (2020) find
that the increase in social distancing is largely voluntary, and driven by information.5 An-
other study by Gupta et al. (2020) also found little evidence that stay-at-home mandates
induced distancing using mobility measures from PlaceIQ and SafeGraph. Using data from
SafeGraph, Andersen (2020) show that there has been substantial voluntary social distanc-
ing but also provide evidence that mandatory measures such as stay at home order have
been effective at reducing the frequency of visits outside of ones home.
Pei, Kandula, and Shaman (2020) use county-level observations of reported infections
and deaths in conjunction with mobility data from SafeGraph to estimate how effective
reproductive numbers in major metropolitan areas change over time. They conduct simu-
lation of implementing all policies 1-2 weeks earlier and found that it would have resulted
in reducing the number of cases and deaths by more than half. Without using any policy
variables, however, their study does not explicitly analyze how policies are related to the
effective reproduction numbers.
Epidemiologists use model simulations to predict how cases and deaths evolve for the
purpose of policy recommendation. As reviewed by Avery et al. (2020), there exist sub-
stantial uncertainty in parameters associated with the determinants of infection rates and
asymptomatic rates (Stock, 2020b). Simulations are often done under strong assumptions
about the impact of social distancing policies without connecting to the relevant data (e.g.,
Ferguson et al., 2020). Furthermore, simulated models do not take into account that people
may limit their contact with other people in response to higher transmission risks. When
5Specifically, they find that of the 60 percentage point drop in workplace intensity, 40 percentage points
can be explained by changes in information as proxied by case numbers, while roughly 8 percentage points
can be explained by policy changes.
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such a voluntary behavioral response is ignored, simulations would produce exponential
spread of disease and would over-predict cases and deaths. Our counterfactual experiments
illustrate the importance of this voluntary behavioral change.
Whether wearing masks in public place should be mandatory or not has been one of the
most contested policy issues, where health authorities of different countries provide con-
tradicting recommendations. Reviewing evidence, Greenhalgh et al. (2020) recognizes that
there is no randomized controlled trial evidence for effectiveness of face masks but they
state “indirect evidence exists to support the argument for the public wearing masks in
the Covid-19 pandemic.”6 Howard et al. (2020) also review available medical evidence and
conclude that “mask wearing reduces the transmissibility per contact by reducing trans-
mission of infected droplets in both laboratory and clinical contexts.” Given the lack of
experimental evidence, conducting observational studies is useful and important. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical study that shows the effectiveness of
mask mandates on reducing the spread of Covid-19 by analyzing the US state-level data.
This finding corroborates and is complementary to the medical observational evidence in
Howard et al. (2020).
2. The Causal Model for the Effect of Policies, Behavior, and Information
on Growth of Infection
2.1. The Causal Model and Its Structural Equation Form. We introduce our ap-
proach through the Wright-style causal diagram shown in Figure 4. The diagram describes
how policies, behavior, and information interact together:
• The forward health outcome, Yit, is determined last, after all other variables have
been determined;
• The adopted policies, Pit, affect Yit either directly, or indirectly by altering human
behavior Bit;
• Information variables, Iit, such as lagged valued of outcomes can affect both human
behavior, adopted policies , and future outcome;
• The confounding factors Wit, which could vary across states and time, affect all
other variables.
The index i describes observational unit, the state, and t describes the time.
We begin to introduce more context by noting that our main outcome of interest is
the forward growth rate in the reported new Covid-19 cases; behavioral variables include
proportion of time spent in transit or shopping and others; policy variables include stay-
at-home order and school and business closure variables; the information variables include
lagged values of outcome. We provide detailed description and time of these variables in
the next section.
6The virus remains viable in the air for several hours, for which surgical masks may be effective. Also, a
substantial fraction of individual who are infected become infectious before showing symptom onset.
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Pit
Iit Yit
Bit
Iit
Wit
Figure 4. P. Wright type causal path diagram for our model.
The causal structure allows for the effect of the policy to be either direct or indirect –
through-behavior or through dynamics; and all of these effects are not mutually exclusive.
The structure allows for changes in behavior to be brought by change in policies and infor-
mation. These are all realistic properties that we expect from the contextual knowledge of
the problem. Policy, such as closures of schools, non-essential business, restaurants, alter
and constrain behavior in strong ways. In contrast, policies, such as mandating employees
to wear masks, can potentially affect the Covid-19 transmission directly. The information
variables, such as recent growth in the number of cases, can cause people to spend more
time at home, regardless of adopted state policies; these changes in behavior in turn affect
the transmission of Covid-19.
The causal ordering induced by this directed acyclical graph is determined by the follow-
ing timing sequence within a period :
(1) confounders and information get determined,
(2) policies are set in place, given information and confounders;
(3) behavior is realized, given policies, information and confounders; and
(4) outcomes get realized, given policies, behavior, and confounders.
The model also allows for direct dynamic effect of the information variables on the out-
come through autoregressive structures, that capture persistence in the growth patterns.
As further highlighted below, realized outcomes may become new information for future
periods, inducing dynamics over multiple periods.
Our quantitative model for causal structure in Figure 4 is given by the following econo-
metric structural equation model:
Yit(b, p) :=α
′b+ pi′p+ µ′ι+ δ′YWit + ε
y
it, ε
y
it ⊥ Iit,Wit
Bit(p, ι) :=β
′p+ γ′ι+ δ′BWit + ε
b
it, ε
b
it ⊥ Iit,Wit
(SEM)
which is a collection of functional relations with stochastic shocks, decomposed into observ-
able part δW and unobservable part ε. The terms εyit and ε
b
it are the centered stochastic
shocks that obey the orthogonality restrictions posed in these equations. (We say that
V ⊥ U if EV U = 0).
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The policies can be modeled via a linear form as well,
Pit(ι) := η
′ι+ δ′PWit + ε
p
it, ε
p
it ⊥ Iit,Wit (P)
although our identification and inference strategies do not rely on the linearity.7.
The observed variables are generated by setting ι = Iit and propagating the system from
the last equation to the first:
Yit :=Yit(Bit, Pit, Iit)
Bit :=Bit(Pit, Iit)
Pit :=Pit(Iit).
(O)
The system above implies the following collection of stochastic equations for realized
variables:
Yit = α
′Bit + pi′Pit + µ′Iit + δ′YWit + ε
y
it, ε
y
it ⊥ Bit, Pit, Iit,Wit (BPI→Y)
Bit = β
′Pit + γ′Iit + δ′BWit + ε
b
it, ε
b
it ⊥ Pit, Iit,Wit (PI→B)
Pit = η
′Iit + δ′PWit + ε
p
it, ε
p
it ⊥ Iit,Wit (I→P)
which in turn imply
Yit = (α
′β′ + pi′)Pit + (α′γ′ + µ′)Iit + δ¯′Wit + ε¯it, ε¯it ⊥ Pit, Iit,Wit (PI→Y)
for δ¯′ = α′δ′B + δ
′
Y and ε¯it = α
′εbit + ε
y
it. These equations form the basis of our empirical
analysis.
Identification and Parameter Estimation. The orthogonality equations imply that
these are all projection equations, and the parameters of SEM are identified by the pa-
rameters of these regression equation, provided the latter are identified by sufficient joint
variation of these variables across states and time.
The last point can be stated formally as follows. Consider the previous system of equa-
tions, after partialling out the confounders:
Y˜it =α
′B˜it + pi′P˜it + µ′I˜it + ε
y
it, ε
y
it ⊥ B˜it, P˜it, I˜it,
B˜it =β
′P˜it + γ′I˜it + εbit, ε
b
it ⊥ P˜it, I˜it,
P˜it =η
′I˜it + ε
p
it, ε
p
it ⊥ I˜it
(1)
where V˜it = Vit−W ′itE[WitW ′it]−E[WitVit] denotes the residual after removing the orthogonal
projection of Vit on Wit. The residualization is a linear operator, implying that (1) follows
immediately from above. The parameters of (1) are identified as projection coefficients in
these equations, provided that residualized vectors appearing in each of the equations have
non-singular variance, that is
Var(P˜ ′it, B˜
′
it, I˜
′
it) > 0, Var(P˜
′
it, I˜
′
it) > 0, and Var(I˜
′
it) > 0. (2)
7This can be replaced by an arbitrary non-additive function Pit(ι) = p(ι,Wit, ε
p
it), where (possibly infinite-
dimensional) εpit is independent of Iit and Wit
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Our main estimation method is the standard correlated random effects estimator, where
the random effects are parameterized as functions of observable characteristic. The state-
level random effects are modeled as a function of state level characteristics, and the time
random effects are modeled by including a smooth trend and its interaction with state level
characteristics. The stochastic shocks {εit}Tt=1 are treated as independent across states i
and can be arbitrarily dependent across time t within a state.
A secondary estimation method is the fixed effects estimator, where Wit includes latent
(unobserved) state level effects Wi and and time level effects Wt, which must be estimated
from the data. This approach is much more demanding on the data and relies on long
cross-sectional and time histories. When histories are relatively short, large biases emerge
and they need to be removed using debiasing methods. In our context debiasing materially
change the estimates, often changing the sign.8 However, we find the debiased fixed effect
estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the correlated random effects esti-
mates. Given this finding, we chose to focus on the latter, as a more standard and familiar
method, and report the former estimates in the supplementary materials for this paper.9
2.2. Information Structures and Induced Dynamics. We consider three examples of
information structures:
(I1) Information variable is time trend:
Iit = log(t).
(I2) Information variable is lagged value of outcome:
Iit = Yi,t−`.
(I3) Information variables include trend, lagged and integrated values of outcome:
Iit =
(
log(t), Yi,t−`,
∞∑
m=1
Yi,t−`m
)′
,
with the convention that Yi,t = 0 for t ≤ 0.
The first information structure captures the basic idea that, as individuals discover more
information about covid over time, they adapt safer modes of behavior (stay at home,
wear masks, wash hands). Under this structure, information is common across states and
exogenously evolves over time, independent of the number of cases. The second structure
arises for considering autoregressive components and captures people’s behavioral response
to information on cases in the state they reside. Specifically, we model persistence in growth
Yit rate through AR(1) model, which leads to Iit = Yi,t−7. This provides useful local, state-
specific, information about the forward growth rate and people may adjust their behavior
to safer modes when they see a high value. We model this adjustment via the term γ′It in
8This is cautionary message for other researchers intending to use fixed effects estimator in the context
of Covid-19 analysis. Only debiased fixed effects estimators must be used.
9The similarity of the debiased fixed effects and correlated random effects served as a useful specification
check. Moreover, using the fixed effects estimators only yielded minor gains in predictive performances, as
judging by the adjusted R2’s, providing another useful specification check.
10 VICTOR CHERNOZHUKOV, HIROYUKI KASAHARA, AND PAUL SCHRIMPF
the behavior equation. The third information structure is the combination of the first two
structures plus an additional term representing the (log of) total number of new cases in
the state. We use this information structure in our empirical specification. In this structure
people respond to both global information, captured by trend, and local information sources,
captured by the local growth rate and the total number of cases. The last element of the
information set can be thought of as local stochastic trend in cases.
All of these examples fold into a specification of the form:
Iit := Iit(Ii(t−`), Yi(t−`), t), t = 1, ..., T, (I)
with the initialization Ii0 = 0 and Yi0 = 0.
10
With any structure of this form, realized outcomes may become new information for
future periods, inducing a dynamical system over multiple periods. We show the resulting
dynamical system in a causal diagram of Figure 5. Specification of this system is useful
for studying delayed effects of policies and behaviors, and in considering the counterfactual
policy analysis.
Ii(t−7)
Yi(t−7)
Iit
Yit
Ii(t+7)
Yi(t+7)
S
E
M
(t-7
)
S
E
M
(t)
S
E
M
(t+
7
)
Figure 5. Dynamic System Induced by Information Structure and SEM
2.3. Outcome and Key Confounders via SIR Model. Letting Cit denotes cumulative
number of confirmed cases in state i at time t, our outcome
Yit := ∆ log(∆Cit) := log(∆Cit)− log(∆Ci,t−7) (3)
approximates the weekly growth rate in new cases from t − 7 to t.11 Here ∆ denotes the
differencing operator over 7 days from t to t− 7, so that ∆Cit := Cit−Ci,t−7 is the number
of new confirmed cases in the past 7 days.
We chose this metric as this is the key metric for policy makers deciding when to relax
Covid mitigation policies. The U.S. government’s guidelines for state reopening recommend
that states display a “downward trajectory of documented cases within a 14-day period”
10The initialization is appropriate in our context for analyzing pandemics from the very beginning, but
other initializations could be appropriate in other contexts.
11We may show that log(∆Cit)− log(∆Ci,t−7) approximates the average growth rate of cases from t− 7
to t.
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(White House, 2020). A negative value of Yit is an indication of meeting this criteria for
reopening. By focusing on weekly cases rather than daily cases, we smooth idiosyncratic
daily fluctuations as well as periodic fluctuations associated with days of the week.
Our measurement equation for estimating equations (BPI→Y) and (PI→Y) will take the
form:
Yit = θ
′Xit + δT∆ log(T )it + δD
Tit∆Dit
∆Cit
+ it, (M)
where i is state, t is day, Cit is cumulative confirmed cases, Dit is deaths, Tit is the number of
tests over 7 days, ∆ is a 7-days differencing operator, it is an unobserved error term, where
Xit collects other behavioral, policy, and confounding variables, depending on whether we
estimate (BPI→Y) or (PI→Y). Here
∆ log(T )it and δD
Tit∆Dit
∆Cit
are the key confounding variables, derived from considering the SIR model below. We
describe other confounders in the empirical section.
Our main estimating equation (M) is motivated by a variant of a SIR model, where we
incorporate a delay between infection and death instead of a constant death rate, and we
add confirmed cases to the model. Let S, I, R, and D denote the number of susceptible,
infected, recovered, and dead individuals in a given state or province. Each of these variables
are a function of time. We model them as evolving as
S˙(t) = −S(t)
N
β(t)I(t) (4)
I˙(t) =
S(t)
N
β(t)I(t)− S(t− `)
N
β(t− `)I(t− `) (5)
R˙(t) = (1− pi)S(t− `)
N
β(t− `)I(t− `) (6)
D˙(t) = pi
S(t− `)
N
β(t− `)I(t− `) (7)
where N is the population, β(t) is the rate of infection spread, ` is the duration between
infection and death, and pi is the probability of death conditional on infection.12
Confirmed cases, C(t), evolve as
C˙(t) = τ(t)I(t), (8)
where τ(t) is the rate that infections are detected.
Our goal is to examine how the rate of infection β(t) varies with observed policies and
measures of social distancing behavior. A key challenge is that we only observed C(t) and
12The model can easily be extended to allow a non-deterministic disease duration. This leaves our main
estimating equation (9) unchanged, as long as the distribution of duration between infection and death is
equal to the distribution of duration between infection and recovery.
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D(t), but not I(t). The unobserved I(t) can be eliminated by differentiating (8) and using
(5) and (7) as
C¨(t)
C˙(t)
=
S(t)
N
β(t) +
τ˙(t)
τ(t)
− 1
pi
τ(t)D˙(t)
C˙(t)
. (9)
We consider a discrete-time analogue of equation (9) to motivate our empirical specification
by relating the detection rate τ(t) to the number of tests Tit while specifying
S(t)
N β(t) as a
linear function of variables Xit. This results in
Yit
C¨(t)
C˙(t)
= X ′itθ + it
S(t)
N
β(t)
+ δT∆ log(T )it
τ˙(t)
τ(t)
+ δD
Tit∆Dit
∆Cit
1
pi
τ(t)D˙(t)
C˙(t)
,
which is equation (M), where Xit captures a vector of variables related to β(t).
Structural Interpretation. In the early pandemics, when the num-
ber of susceptibles is approximately the same as the entire population, i.e.
Sit/Nit ≈ 1, the component X ′itθ is the projection of infection rate βi(t)
on Xit (policy, behavioral, information, and confounders other than testing
rate), provided the stochastic component it is orthogonal to Xit and the
testing variables:
βi(t)Sit/Nit = X
′
itθ + it, it ⊥ Xit.
3. Decomposition and Counterfactual Policy Analysis
3.1. Total Change Decomposition. Given the SEM formulation above, we can carry
out the following decomposition analysis, after removing the effects of confounders. For
example, we can decompose the total change EY˜it−EY˜io in the expected outcome, measured
at two different time points t and o = t− ` into sum of three components:
EY˜it − EY˜io
Total Change
= α′β′
(
EP˜it − EP˜io
)
Policy Effect via Behavior
+ pi′
(
EP˜it − EP˜io
)
Direct Policy Effect
+ α′γ′
(
EI˜it − EI˜io
)
+ µ′
(
EI˜it − EI˜io
)
Dynamic Effect
=: PEBt + PEDt + DynEt,
(10)
where the first two components are immediate effect and the third is delayed or dynamic
effect.
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In the three examples of information structure given earlier, we have the following form
for the dynamic effect:
(I1) DynEt = γα log `+ µ log `,
(I2) DynEt =
∑t/`
m=1 (γα+ µ)
m (PEBt−m` + PEDt−m`),
(I3) DynEt =
∑t/`
m=0 (((γα)2 + µ2 + (γα)3 + µ3)
m ((γα)1 log `+ µ1 log `)
+
∑t/`
m=1 (((γα)2 + µ2 + (γα)3 + µ3)
m (PEBt−m` + DPEt−m`)
+
∑t/`−1
m=1 ((γα)3 + µ3)
m (PEBt−(m+1)` + DPEt−(m+1)`) .
The effects can be decomposed into (a) delayed policy effects via behavior by summing terms
containing PEB, (b) delayed policy effects via direct impact by summing terms containing
DPE, and (c) pure behavior effects, and (d) pure dynamic feedback effects.
3.2. Counterfactuals. We also consider simple counterfactual exercises, where we examine
the effects of setting a sequence of counterfactual policies for each state:
{P ?it}Tt=1, i = 1, . . . N.
We assume that the SEM remains invariant, except of course for the policy equation.13
Given the policies we propagate the dynamic equations:
Y ?it :=Yit(B
?
it, P
?
it, I
?
it),
B?it :=Bit(P
?
it, I
?
it),
I?it :=Iit(I
?
i(t−1), Y
∗
i(t−1), t),
(CEF-SEM)
with the initialization I?i0 = 0, Y
?
i0 = 0, B
?
i0 = 0, P
?
i0 = 0. In stating this counterfactual
system of equations, we make the following invariance assumption
Invariance Assumption. The equations of (CF-SEM) remain exactly of
the same form as in the (SEM) and (I). That is, under the policy intervention
{P ?it}, that is, parameters and stochastic shocks in (SEM) and (I) remain
the same as under the original policy intervention {Pit}.
Let PY ?it and PYit denote the predicted values, produced by working with the counter-
factual system (CEF-SEM) and the factual system (SEM):
PY ?it = (α′β′ + pi′)P ?it + (α′γ′ + µ′)I?it + δ¯′Wit,
PYit = (α′β′ + pi′)Pit + (α′γ′ + µ′)Iit + δ¯′Wit.
In generating these predictions we make the assumption of invariance stated above.
13It is possible to consider counterfactual exercises in which policy responds to information through the
policy equation if we are interested in endogenous policy responses to information. Although this is beyond
the scope of the current paper, counterfactual experiments with endogenous government policy would be
important, for example, to understand the issues related to the lagged response of government policies to
higher infection rates due to incomplete information.
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Then we can write the difference into the sum of three components:
PY ?it − PYit
Predicted CF Change
= α′β′(P ?it − Pit)
CF Policy Effect via Behavior
+ pi′ (P ?it − Pit)
CF Direct Effect
+ α′γ′ (I?it − Iit) + µ′ (I?it − Iit)
CF Dynamic Effect
=: PEB?it + PED
?
it + DynE
?
it.
(11)
Similarly to what we had before, the counterfactual dynamic effects take the form:
(I1) DynE?it = γα log `+ µ log `,
(I2) DynE?it =
∑t/`
m=1 (γα+ µ)
m (PEB?i(t−m`) + PED
?
i(t−m`)),
(I3) DynE?it =
∑t/`
m=0 ((γα)2 + µ2 + (γα)3 + µ3)
m ((γα)1 log `+ µ1 log `)
+
∑t/`
m=1 ((γα)2 + µ2 + (γα)3 + µ3)
m
(
PEB?i(t−m`) + DPE
?
i(t−m)`
)
+
∑t/`−1
m=1 ((γα)3 + µ3)
m
(
PEB?i(t−(m+1)`) + DPE
?
i(t−(m+1)`)
)
.
The effects can be decomposed into (a) delayed policy effects via behavior by summing terms
containing PEB, (b) delayed policy effects via direct impact by summing terms containing
DPE, and (c) pure behavior effects, and (d) pure dynamic feedback effects.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Data. Our baseline measures for daily Covid-19 cases and deaths are from The New
York Times (NYT). When there are missing values in NYT, we use reported cases and
deaths from JHU CSSE, and then the Covid Tracking Project. The number of tests for
each state is from Covid Tracking Project. As shown in Figure 23 in the appendix, there
was a rapid increase in testing in the second half of March and then the number of tests
increased very slowly in each state in April.
We use the database on US state policies created by Raifman et al. (2020). In our
analysis, we focus on 7 policies: state of emergency, stay at home, closed nonessential
businesses, closed K-12 schools, closed restaurants except takeout, close movie theaters,
and mandate face mask by employees in public facing businesses. We believe that the first
five of these policies are the most widespread and important. Closed movie theaters is
included because it captures common bans on gatherings of more than a handful of people.
We also include mandatory face mask use by employees because its effectiveness on slowing
down Covid-19 spread is a controversial policy issue (Howard et al., 2020; Greenhalgh et al.,
2020). Table 1 provides summary statistics, where N is the number of states that have ever
implemented the policy. We also obtain information on state-level covariates from Raifman
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et al. (2020), which include population size, total area, unemployment rate, poverty rate,
and a percentage of people who are subject to illness.
N Min Median Max
State of emergency 51 2020-02-29 2020-03-11 2020-03-16
Date closed K 12 schools 51 2020-03-13 2020-03-17 2020-04-03
Stay at home shelter in place 42 2020-03-19 2020-03-28 2020-04-07
Closed movie theaters 49 2020-03-16 2020-03-21 2020-04-06
Closed restaurants except take out 48 2020-03-15 2020-03-17 2020-04-03
Closed non essential businesses 43 2020-03-19 2020-03-25 2020-04-06
Mandate face mask use by employees 36 2020-04-03 2020-05-01 2020-05-11
Table 1. State Policies
We obtain social distancing behavior measures from“Google COVID-19 Community Mo-
bility Reports” (LLC, 2020). The dataset provides six measures of “mobility trends” that
report a percentage change in visits and length of stay at different places relative to a
baseline computed by their median values of the same day of the week from January 3
to February 6, 2020. Our analysis focuses on the following four measures: “Grocery &
pharmacy,” “Transit stations,” “Retail & recreation,” and “Workplaces.”14
In our empirical analysis, we use weekly measures for cases, deaths, and tests by summing
up their daily measures from day t to t − 6. We focus on weekly cases because daily new
cases are affected by the timing of reporting and testing, and are quite volatile as shown in
Figure 20 in the appendix. Similarly, reported daily deaths and tests are subject to high
volatility. Aggregating to weekly new cases/deaths/tests smooths out idiosyncratic daily
noises as well as periodic fluctuations associated with days of the week. We also construct
weekly policy and behavior variables by taking 7 day moving averages from day t − 14 to
t− 21, where the delay reflects the time lag between infection and case confirmation. The
four weekly behavior variables are referred as “Transit Intensity,” “Workplace Intensity,”
“Retail Intensity,” and “Grocery Intensity.” Consequently, our empirical analysis uses 7
days moving averages of all variables recorded at daily frequencies.
Table 2 reports that weekly policy and behavior variables are highly correlated with each
other, except for the“masks for employees” policy. High correlations may cause multicol-
inearity problem and potentially limits our ability to separately identify the effect of each
policy or behavior variable on case growth but this does not prevent us from identifying the
aggregate effect of all policies and behavior variables on case growth.
4.2. The Effect of Policies and Information on Behavior. We first examine how poli-
cies and information affect social distancing behaviors by estimating a version of (PI→B):
Bjit = (β
j)′Pit + (γj)′Iit + (δ
j
B)
′Wit + ε
bj
it
14The other two measures are “Residential” and “Parks.” We drop “Residential” because it is highly
correlated with “Workplaces” and “Retail & recreation” at correlation coefficients of -0.99 and -0.98 as shown
in Table 2. We also drop “Parks” because it does not have clear implication on the spread of Covid-19.
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Table 2. Correlations among Policies and Behavior
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residential 1.00
transit -0.95 1.00
workplaces -0.99 0.93 1.00
retail -0.98 0.93 0.96 1.00
grocery -0.81 0.83 0.78 0.82 1.00
closed K-12 schools 0.90 -0.80 -0.93 -0.87 -0.65 1.00
stay at home 0.73 -0.75 -0.74 -0.70 -0.72 0.70 1.00
closed movie theaters 0.83 -0.76 -0.85 -0.81 -0.69 0.88 0.78 1.00
closed restaurants 0.85 -0.79 -0.85 -0.84 -0.70 0.84 0.74 0.88 1.00
closed businesses 0.73 -0.70 -0.73 -0.71 -0.70 0.66 0.80 0.75 0.75 1.00
masks for employees 0.29 -0.32 -0.31 -0.24 -0.22 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.21 1.00
state of emergency 0.84 -0.75 -0.85 -0.82 -0.45 0.92 0.63 0.81 0.79 0.60 0.37 1.00
Each off-diagonal entry reports a correlation coefficient of a pair of policy and behavior variables.
where Bjit represents behavior variable j in state i at t− 14. Pit collects the Covid related
policies in state i at t − 14. Confounders, Wit, include state-level covariates, the growth
rate of tests, the past number of tests, and one week lagged dependent variable which may
capture unobserved differences in policies across states.
Iit is a set of information variables that affect people’s behaviors at t − 14. Here, and
throughout our empirical analysis, we focus on two specifications for information. In the
first, we assume that information is captured by a trend and a trend interacted with state-
level covariates, which is a version of information structure (I1). We think of this trend as
summarizing national aggregate information on Covid-19. The second information specifi-
cation is based on information structure (I3), where we additionally allow information to
vary with each state’s lagged growth of new cases, lag(∆ log ∆C, 7), and lagged log new
cases, lag(log ∆C, 14).
Table 3 reports the estimates. Across different specifications, our results imply that poli-
cies have large effects on behavior. School closures appear to have the largest effect, followed
by restaurant closures. Somewhat surprisingly, stay at home and closure of non essential
businesses appear to have modest effects on behavior. The effect of masks for employees is
also small. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. Differences between
policy effects are generally statistically insignificant; except for masks for employees, the
policies are highly correlated and it is difficult to separate their effects.
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Table 3. The Effect of Policies and Information on Behavior (PI→B)
Dependent variable:
Trend Information Lag Cases Information
workplaces retail grocery transit workplaces retail grocery transit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
masks for employees 1.149 −0.613 −0.037 0.920 −0.363 −1.541∗ −1.437 −1.573∗∗
(1.175) (1.975) (1.510) (2.760) (0.563) (0.925) (0.908) (0.756)
closed K-12 schools −14.443 −16.428 −14.201 −16.937∗∗∗ −7.811∗∗ −8.516∗∗ −12.917∗∗∗ −6.312∗
(4.201) (5.740) (3.852) (6.037) (3.060) (3.940) (3.992) (3.347)
stay at home −3.989 −5.894 −7.558 −10.513∗∗∗ −0.842 −1.440∗ −3.705∗∗∗ 0.306
(1.303) (1.483) (1.730) (3.004) (0.626) (0.817) (1.067) (0.863)
closed movie theaters −2.607 −6.240 −3.260 0.600 −0.745 −2.185∗ −2.605∗∗ −0.037
(1.434) (1.538) (1.486) (2.895) (0.726) (1.226) (1.124) (1.087)
closed restaurants −2.621 −4.746 −2.487 −6.277∗ −1.816∗∗ −3.181∗∗∗ −2.037∗∗ −2.200∗∗
(1.388) (1.643) (1.122) (3.284) (0.716) (1.146) (0.894) (0.946)
closed businesses −4.469 −4.299 −4.358 −3.593 −0.274 0.721 −0.835 1.476∗∗
(1.303) (1.422) (1.376) (2.276) (0.661) (0.827) (0.998) (0.751)
∆ log Tst 1.435 1.420 1.443 1.547
∗∗∗ 0.486 0.555 0.396 0.314
(0.218) (0.330) (0.397) (0.402) (0.469) (0.579) (0.308) (0.593)
lag(tests per 1000, 7) 0.088 0.042 0.025 −0.703∗ 0.228∗ 0.193 0.186 −0.047
(0.179) (0.368) (0.199) (0.376) (0.124) (0.187) (0.142) (0.145)
log(days since 2020-01-15) −7.589 38.828 2.777 27.182 15.857 53.761∗∗∗ 34.870 49.412∗∗∗
(24.805) (31.618) (27.460) (24.084) (12.435) (14.282) (21.454) (11.675)
lag(∆ log ∆Cst, 7) −1.342∗∗∗ −1.000∗ −0.819 −0.591
(0.406) (0.552) (0.591) (0.520)
lag(log ∆Cst, 14) −0.291 0.430 −1.020∗ 1.030∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.445) (0.550) (0.335)
∆D
∆C Tst −2.306∗∗ −4.041∗∗ 0.602 −3.243∗∗∗
(1.035) (1.727) (1.031) (1.059)
lag(workplaces, 7) 0.548∗∗∗
(0.059)
lag(retail, 7) 0.581∗∗∗
(0.049)
lag(grocery, 7) 0.412∗∗∗
(0.066)
lag(transit, 7) 0.869∗∗∗
(0.038)
log t × state variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
state variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑
j Policyj -26.98 -38.22 -31.90 -35.80 -11.85 -16.14 -23.54 -8.34
(4.32) (6.06) (4.53) (6.11) (3.18) (4.02) (4.36) (3.32)
Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,002 3,002 3,002 3,002
R2 0.750 0.678 0.676 0.717 0.891 0.843 0.770 0.935
Adjusted R2 0.749 0.676 0.674 0.715 0.890 0.842 0.768 0.934
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variables are “Transit Intensity,” “Workplace Intensity,” “Retail Intensity,” and “Grocery Intensity” defined as 7 days moving averages of corresponding daily
measures obtained from Google Mobility Reports. Columns (1)-(4) use specifications with the information structure (I1) while columns (5)-(8) use those with the
information structure (I3). All specifications include state-level characteristics (population, area, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and a percentage of people subject to
illness) as well as their interactions with the log of days since Jan 15, 2020. The row “
∑
j Policyj” reports the sum of six policy coefficients.
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In columns (1)-(4), the estimated sum effect of all policies are substantial and can ac-
count for a large fraction of observed declines in behavior variables. For example, retail
intensity was approximately -40% at its lowest point in mid April, and the estimated policy
coefficients imply that imposing all six policies would lead to 38.2/40 ≈ 95% of the observed
decline.
Columns (5)-(8) reports the estimated coefficients for the model with lagged dependent
variables. Except for transit, the estimated coefficients of lagged growth of new cases and
lagged new cases are negative and often significant at conventional levels. This suggests that
both the growth and the number of past cases reduce social interactions, perhaps because
people are increasingly aware of prevalence of Covid-19 (Maloney and Taskin, 2020).
The estimated aggregate effects of policies in columns (5)-(8) are largely consistent with
those reported in columns (1)-(4). Columns (5)-(8) include lagged dependent variables, so to
compare the magnitude of estimates between columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8), we should look at
a “long-run” aggregate effect in (5)-(8) by dividing by the 1− ρˆj where ρˆj is the estimated
coefficient of lagged dependent variable. We put quotes on “long-run” because this is a
long-run effect holding information (i.e. lagged growth and lagged log cases) constant. For
retail, the implied information constant long-run aggregate effect of policies is estimated at
−16.14/(1− 0.581) = −38.5%, among which −16.1% is attributable to the short-run effect.
4.3. The Direct Effect of Policies and Behavior on Case Growth. We now ana-
lyze how behavior and policies together influence case growth rates by estimating equation
(BPI→Y).
Yit = α
′Bit + pi′Pit + µ′Iit + δ′YWit
δ′XWX,it+δT∆ log(T )it+δD
Tit∆Dit
∆Cit
+εyit, (12)
where Bit = (B
1
it, ..., B
4
it)
′ is a vector of four behavior variables in state i at t − 14, where
a lag length of 14 days is chosen to reflect the delay between infection and confirmation.15
Pit includes the Covid related policies in state i at t− 14 that directly affect the spread of
Covid-19 after controlling for behavior variables (e.g., masks for employees). We include
information variables, Iit, as covariates because some information variables such as the past
confirmed cases may be correlated with (latent) government policies or people’s behaviors
that are not fully captured by our observed policy and behavior variables. WX,it consists
of state-level covariates. As discussed in section 2.3, equation (12) corresponds to (M)
derived from the SIR model, and the terms δT∆ log(T )it and δD
Tit∆Dit
∆Cit
capture the effect
of changing test rates on confirmed cases.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating (12). In columns (1) and (3), we use “state of
emergency” policy as a proxy for all other policies because a “state of emergency” order
can be viewed as preparation for implementing a variety of policies subsequently. The re-
sults indicate that mandatory face masks reduce infections while holding behavior constant,
suggesting that requiring masks may be an effective preventive measure. Except for mask
15As we review in the Appendix A.6, a lag length of 14 days is broadly consistent with currently available
evidence.
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Table 4. The Direct Effect of Behavior and Policies on Case Growth (PBI→Y )
Dependent variable:
Trend Information Lag Cases Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag(state of emergency, 14) −0.502 −0.342
(0.141) (0.137)
lag(masks for employees, 14) −0.072 −0.039 −0.104 −0.092∗
(0.050) (0.055) (0.045) (0.048)
lag(closed K-12 schools, 14) −0.132 −0.130
(0.116) (0.115)
lag(stay at home, 14) −0.028 −0.054
(0.068) (0.077)
lag(closed movie theaters, 14) 0.144 0.132∗∗
(0.056) (0.061)
lag(closed restaurants, 14) −0.035 −0.077
(0.060) (0.079)
lag(closed businesses, 14) −0.022 0.008
(0.049) (0.057)
lag(workplaces, 14) 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
lag(retail, 14) 0.006 0.014 0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
lag(grocery, 14) 0.002 −0.007 0.007 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
lag(transit, 14) 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ log Tst 0.106 0.115 0.120 0.121∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
lag(tests per 1000, 7) −0.007 −0.004 0.025 0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
log(days since 2020-01-15) 4.691 3.779 3.170 2.519∗
(1.562) (1.504) (1.268) (1.379)
lag(∆ log ∆Cst, 7) −0.139 −0.140∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049)
lag(log ∆Cst, 14) −0.132 −0.149∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.042)
∆D
∆C
Tst −0.267 −0.247∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.094)
log t × state variables Yes Yes Yes No
state variables Yes Yes Yes Yes∑
policies except masks -0.07 -0.12
(0.17) (0.18)∑
wkbehaviork -1.05 -0.54
(0.15) (0.19)
Observations 3,403 3,403 3,403 3,403
R2 0.771 0.765 0.793 0.791
Adjusted R2 0.769 0.763 0.791 0.790
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable is the weekly growth rate of confirmed cases as defined in equation (3). The covariates include
14 days lagged policy and behavior variables, which are constructed as 7 days moving averages between t− 14 to
t− 21 of corresponding daily measures. Columns (1)-(2) use specifications with the information structure (I1) while
columns (3)-(4) use those with the information structure (I3). All specifications include state-level characteristics
(population, area, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and a percentage of people subject to illness) and their
interactions with the log of days since Jan 15, 2020. The row “
∑
policies except for masks” reports the sum of five
policy coefficients except for “masks for employees” while the row “
∑
k wkbehaviork” reports the sum of four
coefficients of behavior variables weighted by the average of each behavioral variable from April 1st-10th.
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Table 5. Immediate Effects
Trend Information Lag Cases Information
masks -0.04 -0.09
(0.06) (0.05)∑
policies except masks -0.07 -0.12
(0.17) (0.18)∑
wkbehaviork -1.05 -0.54
(0.15) (0.19)
The reported numbers are from columns (2) and (4) of Table 4. The row “masks” reports the estimated coefficients
of “masks for employees” on weekly case growth. The row “
∑
policies except for masks” reports the sum of five
policy coefficients except for “masks for employees” while the row “
∑
k wkbehaviork” reports the sum of four
coefficients of behavior variables weighted by the average of each behavioral variable from April 1st-10th.
requirements, policies appear to have little direct effect on confirmed case growth when
behavior is held constant. This supports a directed causal model where causality flows from
policies to behavior to infections.
A useful practical implication of these results are that Google Mobility Reports and
similar data might be useful as a leading indicator of potential case growth. This should
be done cautiously, however, because other changes in the environment might alter the
relationship between behavior and infections. Preventative measures, including mandatory
face masks, and changes in habit that are not captured in our data might alter the future
relationship between Google Mobility Reports and case growth.
Table 5 reports the sum of short run policy and behavior effects. Policy effects are simply
the sum of coefficients. The behavior effect is the sum of coefficients weighted by the average
of the behavioral variables from April 1st-10th.
In the trend information model, the short run and long run effects coincide, abstracting
from any feedback mechanism. On the other hand, if policies are enacted and behavior
changes, then future cases and information will change. The lag cases information model
based on information structure (I3) can capture such feedback effects. However, since the
lag cases information model includes lags of both case growth and log cases, computing
a long-run effect is not completely straightforward. We investigate dynamic effects that
incorporate feedback mechanism through a change in information in section 5.
In this section, we focus our analysis of policy effects when we hold information constant.
The estimates of the effect of policy on behavior in table 4 and of the effect of policies and
behavior and case growth in table 3 can be combined to calculate the total effect of policy
as well as its decomposition into the direct and the indirect effects.
Table 7 show the direct (holding behavior constant) and indirect (through behavior
changes) effects of policy on case growth for the lag cases information model, where the
standard errors are computed by bootstrap and clustered on state. The estimates imply
that all policies combined would reduce the growth rate of cases by 0.451, out of which
0.21 is attributable to direct effect while 0.20 is attributable to indirect effect through their
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impact on behavior, although we need to interpret these numbers carefully given that infor-
mation is held constant. The estimate also indicates that the effect of “masks for employees”
policy is mostly direct.
Table 6. The Total Effect of Policies on Case Growth (PI→Y )
Dependent variable:
Trend Information Lag Cases Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag(state of emergency, 14) −0.998 −0.395
(0.145) (0.150)
lag(masks for employees, 14) −0.076 −0.118 −0.065 −0.174∗∗
(0.095) (0.067) (0.063) (0.071)
lag(closed K-12 schools, 14) −0.842 −0.516∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.123)
lag(stay at home, 14) −0.164 −0.196∗∗
(0.067) (0.076)
lag(closed movie theaters, 14) 0.042 0.060
(0.074) (0.071)
lag(closed restaurants, 14) −0.190 −0.155∗∗
(0.082) (0.077)
lag(closed businesses, 14) −0.090 −0.028
(0.049) (0.058)
∆ log Tst 0.218 0.189 0.191 0.166∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
lag(tests per 1000, 7) −0.016 −0.004 0.028 0.029∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
log(days since 2020-01-15) 3.975 3.277 1.973 2.020
(2.283) (2.149) (1.594) (1.652)
lag(∆ log ∆Cst, 7) −0.012 −0.085∗
(0.061) (0.048)
lag(log ∆Cst, 14) −0.146 −0.154∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.036)
∆D
∆C
Tst −0.448 −0.344∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.087)
log t × state variables Yes Yes Yes No
state variables Yes Yes Yes Yes∑
j Policyj -1.36 -1.01
(0.18) (0.20)
Observations 3,433 3,433 3,427 3,427
R2 0.666 0.707 0.730 0.757
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.705 0.729 0.755
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable is the weekly growth rate of confirmed cases as defined in equation (3). The covariates include
14 days lagged policy variables, which are constructed as 7 days moving averages between t− 14 to t− 21 of
corresponding daily measures. Columns (1)-(2) use specifications with the information structure (I1) while columns
(3)-(4) use those with the information structure (I3). All specifications include state-level characteristics
(population, area, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and a percentage of people subject to illness) and their
interactions with the log of days. The row “
∑
j Policyj” reports the sum of six policy coefficients.
4.4. The Total Effect of Policies on Case Growth. We can also examine the total
effect of policies and information on case growth, by estimating (PI→Y). The coefficients
on policy in this regression combine both the direct and indirect effects. As show in the
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Table 7. Direct and Indirect Policy Effects: Lag Cases Information Model
Direct Via-behavior Total PI→Y Coefficient Difference
masks for employees -0.09 -0.02 -0.11 -0.17 0.06
(0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
closed K-12 schools -0.13 -0.12 -0.25 -0.52 0.27
(0.13) (0.07) (0.12) (0.14) (0.08)
stay at home -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.20 0.13
(0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
closed movie theaters 0.13 -0.02 0.11 0.06 0.05
(0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
closed restaurants -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 0.04
(0.10) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
closed businesses 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05
(0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
all -0.21 -0.20 -0.41 -1.01 0.60
(0.22) (0.11) (0.17) (0.23) (0.18)
Direct effects capture the effect of policy on case growth holding behavior, information, and confounders constant.
Direct effects are given by pi in equation (BPI→Y). Indirect effects capture how policy changes behavior and
behavior shift case growth. They are given by α from (BPI→Y) times β from (PI→B). The total effect is pi + βα.
Column “PI→Y Coefficients” shows the coefficient estimates from PI→Y. Column “Difference” are the differences
between the estimates from (PI→Y) and the combination of (BPI→Y) and (PI→B). Standard errors are computed
by bootstrap and clustered on state.
final two columns of table 7, the policy effects from estimating (PI→Y) are about twice as
large as the policy effect from combining (BPI→Y) and (PI→B).
Table 6 shows the full set of coefficient estimates for (PI→Y). The results are broadly
consistent with what we found above. As in tables 3 and 7, school closures appear to have
the largest effect on growth rates, followed by restaurant closures. However, as mentioned
previously, the policies are highly correlated, so it is difficult to separately identify their
impacts except mask mandates. The coefficient of mandatory face masks is estimated at
-0.174 and significant at 5 percent level.
As reported in column “PI→Y Coefficient” of Table 7, the estimates imply that all policies
combined would reduce ∆ log ∆C by 0.101 for the lag information model. For comparison,
the daily average of ∆ log ∆C reached its peak in mid-March of about three. Since then it
has declined to near 0. This peak of 3 is arguably somewhat overstated because there was
also a rapid increase in testing at that time. If we adjust ∆ log ∆C for increasing in testing
by subtracting 0.166∆ log T , its peak is around 2. Thus, the estimate of -0.101 roughly
imply that policy changes can account for one half of the observed decrease in case growth.
The remainder of the decline is likely due to changes in behavior from information.
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5. Empirical Evaluation of Counterfactual Policies
We now turn our focus to the specification with information as lagged dependent infor-
mation. This allows dynamic feedback effects. Policy and behavior changes that reduce
case growth today can lead to a more optimistic outlook in the future, attenuating longer
run effects. To simplify and focus on dynamics, in this section we work with the estimates
of the total policy effects (equation PI→Y and table 6), rather than decomposing into direct
and via-behavior effects.
5.1. Removing Policies. We first consider the impact of changing from the observed
policies to none. For illustrative purpose, we begin by focusing on Washington. Figure
6 shows the observed, estimated average, and counterfactual without policies average of
∆ log ∆C in Washington. To compute the estimated and counterfactual paths we use the
estimates from column 2 of table 6. We set initial ∆ log ∆C and log ∆C to their values
first observed in the state we are simulating. We hold all other regressors at their observed
values. Error terms are drawn with replacement from the residuals. We do this many times
and report the average over draws of the residuals. To calculate confidence intervals, we
repeat the above with coefficients drawn randomly from their asymptotic distribution. The
shaded region is a point-wise 90% confidence interval. We can see that fit of the estimated
and observed ∆ log ∆C is quite good.
Figure 6 shows the change in case growth from removing policies. Since there is a two week
lag between policy implementation and their effect on recorded cases, the counterfactual
without policy average begins differing from the average with policies two weeks after each
policy was implemented. The effect of removing policies on case growth peaks at about 0.75
and then slowly declines. This decline is due to a feedback effect of information. Without
policies, cases grow more rapidly. With more dire case numbers, people adjust their behavior
to reduce infection. This somewhat offsets the increase in infection from removing policies.
Given the delay between infection and reported case numbers, this offsetting effect takes
some time to appear.
Even small differences in case growth can lead to very large differences in case num-
bers. Removing policies in Washington increases case growth from around 0 to above 0.5
throughout most of April. Figure 7 shows that this increase in growth implies a tremendous
increase in cases.
The effect of removing cases in other states is broadly similar to that in Washington. Fig-
ures 8 and 9 show the changes in growth rate and cases from removing policy interventions
in Illinois and Massachusetts.
Figure 10 shows the average across states of the change in case growth. Similar to
what we saw in Washington, removing policies leads to an increase of about 0.6 in case
growth throughout April. This increase in growth implies a very large increase in cases by
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Figure 6. Case growth with and without policies in Washington
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Figure 7. Change in cases from removing policies in Washington
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late May.16 Figure 11 displays the national increase in aggregate cases without any policy
intervention. The estimates imply 10 to 100 million additional cases by late-May, or a
30-200 fold increase.
16This estimate should be interpreted somewhat cautiously because it involves some extrapolation. The
information variables, in particular logC, soon reach levels not seen in the data.
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Figure 8. Effect of removing policies in Illinois
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Figure 9. Effect of removing policies in Massachusetts
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Figure 10. Average change in case growth from removing policies
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Figure 11. National change in cases from removing policies
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5.2. Non essential Business Closures. A particularly controversial policy is the closure
of non essential businesses. We now examine a counterfactual where non essential businesses
are never closed. Figure 12 shows the effect of leaving non essential businesses open in
Washington. Non essential businesses have a modest impact on cases, with an average
increase of 1000 by late May, with a 90% confidence interval from roughly -1000 to 4000.
Figure 12. Effect of leaving non essential businesses open in Washington
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Figure 13. Effect of leaving businesses open in Illinois
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Figure 15 shows the national aggregate effect of leaving non essential businesses open.
The estimates imply that with non essential businesses open, cases would be about -10 to
50% higher in late May.
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Figure 14. Effect of leaving businesses open in Massachusetts
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Figure 15. National change in cases from leaving non essential businesses open
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5.3. Mask Mandate. As discussed earlier, we find that mask mandates reduce case growth
even holding behavior constant. In other words, mask mandates may reduce infections with
relatively little economic disruption. This makes mask mandates a particularly attractive
policy instrument. In this section we examine what would have happened to cases if all
states had imposed a mask mandate on April 1st. Figure 16 shows the changes in case
growth and cases in Washington. In Figures 17 and 18, implementing mandatory mask
policy on April 1st would have reduced the total number of confirmed cases by 2,500-12,500
in Illinois and 2,000-11,000 in Massachusetts by late-May. Figure 19 shows the national
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Figure 16. Effect of mandating masks on April 1st in Washington
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Figure 17. Effect of mandating masks on April 1st in Illinois
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Figure 18. Effect of mandating masks on April 1st in Massachusetts
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Figure 19. National change in cases from mandating masks on April 1st
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change in case growth and cases. Mandating masks on April 1st leads to 30 to 57% fewer
cases nationally in late May.
6. Conclusion
This paper assesses the effects of policies on the spread of Covid-19 in the US using the
US state-level data on cases, tests, policies, and social distancing behavior measures from
Google Mobility Reports. Our findings are summarized as follows.
First, our empirical analysis indicates that mandating face masks have reduced the spread
of Covid-19 without affecting people’s social distancing behavior measured by Google Mo-
bility Reports. Our counterfactual experiment based on the estimated model indicates that,
if all states had have adopted mandatory face mask policy on April 1st of 2020, then the
number of cases in late-May would have been smaller by 30 to 57 percent, potentially saving
tens of thousands of lives.
Second, we find that the impact of all policies combined on case growth is quite large,
reducing the growth rate of cases by 60 percent. Except for mandatory face mask policy,
the effect of all other policies on case growth is realized through their impact on social
distancing behavior. Our counterfactual experiment shows that, had all policies have been
removed from all states, there would have been 10 to 100 million additional cases by late-
May, suggesting that policy makers should be careful about removing all policies together.
Third, we find that people voluntarily reduce their visits to workplace, transit, grocery,
and transits when they receive information on a higher number of new cases. This suggests
that individuals make decisions to voluntarily limit their contact with others in response
to greater transmission risks, leading to an important feedback mechanism to future cases.
As our counterfactual experiments illustrate, model simulations that ignore this people’s
voluntary behavioral response to information on transmission risks would over-predict the
future number of cases.
Beyond these findings, our paper presents a useful conceptual framework to investigate
the relative roles of policies and information on determining the spread of Covid-19 through
their impact on people’s behavior. Our causal model allows us to explicitly define coun-
terfactual scenarios to properly evaluate the effect of alternative policies on the spread of
Covid-19, and can be used to quantitatively examine various Covid-19 related issues for
future research.
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Appendix A. Data Construction
A.1. Measuring ∆C and ∆ log ∆C. We have three data sets with information on daily
cumulative confirmed cases in each state. As shown in table 8, these cumulative case
numbers are very highly correlated. However, table 9 shows that the numbers are different
more often than not.
NYT JHU CTP
NYT 1.00000 0.99995 0.99990
JHU 0.99995 1.00000 0.99986
CTP 0.99990 0.99986 1.00000
Table 8. Correlation of cumulative cases
1 2 3
NYT 1.00 0.29 0.38
JHU 0.29 1.00 0.33
CTP 0.38 0.33 1.00
Table 9. Portion of cumulative cases that are equal between data sets
Figure 20 shows the evolution of new cases in each of these three datasets. In all cases,
daily changes in cumulative cases displays some excessive volatility. This is likely due to
delays and bunching in testing and reporting of results. Table 10 shows the variance of log
new cases in each data set, as well as their correlations. As shown, the correlations are
approximately 0.9. Also of note, log of The New York Times new case numbers has the
lowest variance.17 In our subsequent results, we will primarily use the case numbers from
The New York Times.
NYT JHU CTP
NYT 1.00 0.88 0.87
JHU 0.88 1.00 0.81
CTP 0.87 0.81 1.00
Variance 5.84 7.17 6.78
Table 10. Correlation and variance of log daily new cases
For most of our results, we focus on new cases in a week instead of in a day. We do this
for two reasons as discussed in the main text. First, a decline of new cases over two weeks
has become a key metric for decision makers. Secondly, aggregating to weekly new cases
smooths out the noise associated with the timing of reporting and testing.
Table 11 reports the correlation and variance of weekly log new cases across the three
data sets. Figure 21 shows the evolution of weekly new cases in each state over time.
17This comparison is somewhat sensitive to how you handle negative and zero cases when taking logs.
Here, we replaced log(0) with log(0.1). In our main results, we work with weekly new cases, which are very
rarely zero.
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Figure 20. Daily cases
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Each line shows daily new cases in a state.
NYT JHU CTP
NYT 1.00 0.99 0.99
JHU 0.99 1.00 0.99
CTP 0.99 0.99 1.00
Variance 4.26 4.46 4.31
Table 11. Correlation and variance of log weekly new cases
A.2. Deaths. Table 12 reports the correlation and variance of weekly deaths in the three
data sets. Figure 22 shows the evolution of weekly deaths in each state. As with cases, we
use death data from The New York Times in our main results.
NYT JHU CTP
NYT 1.00
JHU 1.00
CTP 1.00
Variance 335619.76 330310.42 232303.30
Table 12. Correlation and variance of weekly deaths
A.3. Tests. Our test data comes from The Covid Tracking Project. Figure 23 show the
evolution of tests over time.
A.4. Social Distancing Measures. In measuring social distancing, we focus on Google
Mobility Reports. This data has international coverage and is publicly available. We also
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Figure 21. Weekly Cases
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Each line shows weekly new cases in a state.
Figure 22. Weekly Deaths
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Each line shows weekly deaths in a state.
compare Google Mobility Reports to other social distancing measures from SafeGraph, Un-
acast, and PlaceIQ. Each of these other data sources are limited to the United States.
SafeGraph and Unacast data is not publicly available (both companies make the data avail-
able to researchers at no cost).
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Figure 23. Number of Tests
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These figures use the “total test results” reported by The Covid Tracking Project. This is meant to reflect
the number of people tested (as opposed to the number of specimens tested).
A.5. Policy Variables. We use the database on US state policies created by Raifman
et al. (2020). As discussed in the main text, our analysis focuses on seven policies. For
stay at home, closed nonessential businesses, closed K-12 schools, closed restaurants except
takeout, and close movie theaters, we double-checked any state for which Raifman et al.
(2020) does not record a date. We filled in a few missing dates. Our modified data is
available here. Our modifications fill in 1 value for school closures, 2 for stay at home, 3
for movie theater closure, and 4 for non-essential business closures. Table 13 displays all 25
dated policy variables in Raifman et al. (2020)’s database with our modifications described
above.
A.6. Timing. There is a delay between infection and when a person is tested and appears
in our case data. MIDAS (2020) maintain a list of estimates of the duration of various
stages of Covid-19 infections. The incubation period, the time from infection to symptom
onset, is widely believed to be 5 days. For example, using data from Wuhan, Li et al. (2020)
estimate a mean incubation period of 5.2 days. Siordia (2020) reviews the literature and
concludes the mean incubation period is 3-9 days.
Estimates of the time between symptom onset and case reporting are less common. Using
Italian data, Cereda et al. (2020) estimate an average of 7.3 days between symptom onset
and reporting. Zhang et al. (2020) find an average of 7.4 days using Chinese data from
December to early February, but they find this period declined from 8.9 days in January to
5.4 days in the first week of February. Both of these papers on time from symptom onset
to reporting have large confidence intervals covering approximately 1 to 20 days.
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Based on the above, we expect a delay of roughly two weeks between changes in behavior
or policies, and changes in reported cases.
N Min Median Max
State of emergency 51 2020-02-29 2020-03-11 2020-03-16
Date closed K 12 schools 51 2020-03-13 2020-03-17 2020-04-03
Closed day cares 15 2020-03-16 2020-03-23 2020-04-06
Date banned visitors to nursing homes 30 2020-03-09 2020-03-16 2020-04-06
Stay at home shelter in place 42 2020-03-19 2020-03-28 2020-04-07
End relax stay at home shelter in place 22 2020-04-26 2020-05-06 2020-05-22
Closed non essential businesses 43 2020-03-19 2020-03-25 2020-04-06
Began to reopen businesses statewide 43 2020-04-20 2020-05-04 2020-05-20
Mandate face mask use by all individuals in public spaces 16 2020-04-08 2020-04-19 2020-05-16
Mandate face mask use by employees in public facing businesses 36 2020-04-03 2020-05-01 2020-05-11
Closed restaurants except take out 48 2020-03-15 2020-03-17 2020-04-03
Reopen restaurants 30 2020-04-24 2020-05-10 2020-05-22
Closed gyms 46 2020-03-16 2020-03-20 2020-04-03
Reopened gyms 21 2020-04-24 2020-05-13 2020-05-20
Closed movie theaters 49 2020-03-16 2020-03-21 2020-04-06
Reopened movie theaters 11 2020-04-27 2020-05-08 2020-05-16
Stop Initiation of Evictions overall or due to COVID related issues 24 2020-03-16 2020-03-24 2020-04-20
Stop enforcement of evictions overall or due to COVID related issues 26 2020-03-15 2020-03-23 2020-04-20
Renter grace period or use of security deposit to pay rent 2 2020-04-10 2020-04-17 2020-04-24
Order freezing utility shut offs 34 2020-03-12 2020-03-19 2020-04-13
Froze mortgage payments 1 2020-03-21 2020-03-21 2020-03-21
Modify Medicaid requirements with 1135 waivers date of CMS approval 51 2020-03-16 2020-03-26 2020-04-22
Suspended elective medical dental procedures 33 2020-03-16 2020-03-21 2020-04-16
Resumed elective medical procedures 34 2020-04-20 2020-04-29 2020-05-29
Waived one week waiting period for unemployment insurance 36 2020-03-08 2020-03-18 2020-04-06
Table 13. State Policies
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